Manter-se no euro é manter-se no erro para países como a Grécia e Portugal.

Seguido o conselho de Morleya wise suspense in forming opinions, a wise reserve  in expressing them and a wise tardiness in realizing them –  a redacção/publicação deste artigo foi sendo adiada até ao limite do possível.

Acreditava que viria entretanto algum homem de visão, algum economista não comprometido com o poder, denunciar o verdadeiro acto de masoquismo que é para os países como a Grécia e Portugal manterem-se na moeda única. Senhores! Passados 11 e 13 anos das respectivas entradas na dita união económica e monetária, após milhões e milhões de euros enterrados em betão de estádios e parques imobiliários, em betuminoso de autoestradas, estradas e rotundas, e em moínhos de vento*, o único sector onde estes dois pequenos países continuam a ter uma extensa oferta procurada/apreciada é o do turismo –  na sua variante sol-mar (mais as gastronomias correspondentes). O problema é que, espartilhados pelo elevado valor da moeda única, esta oferta deixou de ser concorrencial – agora,  até os gregos e os portugueses optam por comprar férias mais baratas em destinos mais exóticos.

Parece-vos exagerado o que afirmo? Então façam como eu, leiam gente que deve saber mais, ou melhor, tem obrigação de saber muito mais. Como, por exemplo, o presidente do grupo dos Conservadores e Reformistas no Parlamento Europeu, Martin Callanan:

Greece has bought itself only a little more time
20.06.12 (EUobserver)

The Greek people bought themselves a bit more time at the weekend. However, I fear that we are still kicking the now infamous can a little further down the road.

Given the current situation, it is still my opinion that it would be in the best interests of Greece, the euro zone, and national democracy if Greece were to leave the euro in as orderly a fashion as possible.

Greece continues to stare into the abyss. The last bailout was based on such optimistic projections that a third bailout will eventually become a distinct possibility given the worsening growth figures.

We cannot go on with policies that seek to buy a bit more time and prolong the inevitable. The tough decisions are going to have to be made. They can be made today, or they can be made further down the line. But the longer we wait, the worse the political, social and democratic consequences of this crisis will become.

E, como complemento, não deixem de ler também o diplomata, banqueiro e executivo (e  comentador de economia em 6  cadeias televisivas), Edward Harrison:

The euro zone is one giant vendor financing scheme
4 November 2011 (Credit Writedowns)

In a fixed exchange rate environment like the euro area, you don’t have currency fluctuation issues. So persistent current account imbalances as we see within the euro zone are really a form of vendor financing. …

Vendor financing works successfully as long as the lender makes sure the customer can pay back the loans. …

The lurid Telegraph story about German-made Porsches bought in Greece shows you an extreme example of how this works. The reality is you can’t have Germany and Spain both running current account surpluses with each other at the same time. Unless the euro zone as a whole runs a current account surplus as large as Germany and the Netherlands, then you are automatically going to have a sort of vendor financing relationship going.

The most important is that Germany’s or the Netherlands’ current account surplus matched current account deficits in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. That’s how it works. You sell more to me than I do to you and I get more cash than you do. There are always two sides to every transaction (chart from the FT below).


The large euro-area internal current account imbalances should be seen as a form of vendor financing, whereby the creditors, principally Germany, forward their customers, the debtors, trade finance in order to sell their wares.

*e nos bolsos de muitos e espertos empreiteiros, autarcas, oportunos empresários, seus familiares, amigalhaços, compadres e companheiros de… variadíssimas coisas.

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